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ADMIRALTY.
Cases selected by HORACE L. CHEYNEY.
MARITIME LIENS.

I. Suplies-H-ome Port.
The statute of Michigan (How. Ann. St.,
8236) provides: "That
every water craft above five tons burthen, used or.intended to be used in
navigating the waters of this State, shall be subject to a lien thereon: firsts
for all debts contracted by the owner or part owner, master, agent, clerk,
steward of such craft, on account of supplies and provisions furnished
for the use of such water craft." The lien given by this statute is man*time in its nature, because the contract out of which it springs is maritime, and as such is subject to the limitations of the general maritime
law. It, therefore, does not attach unless the supplies were furnished on
the credit of the ves~el:' 'The Samuel Marshall,"I Circuit Court of Appeals
of the United States, Sixth Circuit, TAFT, J., February 6, 1893, 54 Fed.
Rep., 396.
2.

MaritimeLiens UnderState Statutes-Mfortgageof Vessel--:.
Priority.
A claim arisingunder a mortgage of a vessel is not superior to a lien
under Rev. St. Ill., 1874, c. 12, 1, for supplies and necessaries to the
vessel in her home port in the State of Illinois, although they were furnished after the mortgage was recorded in conformity with Rev. St. U. S.,
S4192: "The J. E. Rumbell," Supreme Court of United States, GRAY, J.,
March 6, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct Rep., 498.

COMMERCIAL LAW.
Cases selected by F.Ncrs H. BoHLN.
BIrLLs AND NOTES.
i. Check Payable to Fictitious Payee-Cerification-Rights of
Bona Fide Holder.
Where a check is drawn, payable to a person under a fictitious name,
in payment for property which it afterward appears he has stolen, and
the bank at which it is payable certifies the check, a bank which subsequently cashes such check, on its being endorsed by the payee with his
fictitious name, acquires a valid title thereto, which it can enforce against
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the certifyig bank; it appearig that, though the payee acted all-through
under a fictitious narpe, yet-the check was received by the identical person to whom its drawer intended to deliver it, and was by him endorsed
ii the name in which it was issued to him, and he, as was intended by the
drawer, received the benefit of it: Armstrong v. Bank, 22 N. R. Rep.,
866, 46 Ohio St., 512, distinguished: Bank. v. Bank, Appellate Court of
Indiana, GxAVih, J.4 February 1, 1893, 33 N. U. Rep., 247.
CONTRACTS OF INFANTS.
2.

'.

FraudulentConveyance of GoodsBougz/-Relief in Equily

An infant was in business as .a merchant, and bought goods on credit
from plaintiffs, who did not know he was an infant. .Before the goods
were paid for, he mingled them with other goods, so they.could not be
identified, and fraudulently conveyed the entire stock of goods ti his,
father. Held, that after.all the goods were sold under attachment it was.
proper for a court of equity to take charge of the fund realized at such
sale, and apply it in .payment of plaintiffs' demands against the infant"
) va~ns v. Morgan, Supreme Court of Mississippi, COOPER, J., 12 So. Rep.,
270.
CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN.

a.

Confession of Judgment-Pennsylvania "Married Perions'
P-operty Ad"I of June3, X887.
Both the rights and liabilities of married women in Pennsylvania have
been greatly and radically changed and enlarged by the Act of 1887. The
authorities which were applicable to questions arising before the passage of that Act are entirely inapplicable now. The' judgment of a married wvoman, which was then presumably void, is now presumably valid.
It is no longer necessary ,to such validity to set out on the record
the facts which before the Act were neessary to give the .judgment
validity.
A married woman has power to confess a judgment for money borrowed to pay off a lien upon her land, where the money is actually used.
for that purpose. "She could neither use nor enjoy her separate real
estate in the same manner as a feme sole if she did not possess such
power. And if she might make a lawful contract of borrowing for such
a purpose, she might be sued thereon, and, of course, might confess a
judgment:" Abell v. Chaffee, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PER
CURIAM, April ip, 1893, 154 Pa., 254.
See, also, Adams 'v. Grey, 154 Pa., 258; Milligan v. Phipps, 153 Id.,
208 (znfra, 4); Latrobe Association v. Fritz, 152 Id., 224; Bauck v. Swan,
146 Id., 444; Koechling v. Henkel, 144 Id., 215.
In Adanis v. Grey,'I54 Pa., 258, 32 W. N. C., 192 (decided April 17,
I893), it was held error to strike offa judgment, regular on its face,
entered on a warrant of attorney, where on a rule to open the judgment
it appeared the defendant was a married woman, though the record
did not show the coverture. STERETT, C. J., held a judgment note
given by a married woman since June 3, 1887, was presumably valid,
and the record need not recite facts which previously were necessary to.
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sustain such a judgment. A motion to set aside, or strike off, a judgment, must be on the ground of irregularity appearing on the face of the
record.
4. -Mecanids Lien Against Properly of Mried Woman in
Pennsylvania.
Since the Married Persons' Property Act of June 3, 1887, "authorizes a married woman to contract in relation to her separate property as
afeme sole, to entitle one to enforce a mechanic's lien for the construction of a building on the land of a married woman, it is not necessary to
allege coverture, and that such building was necessary for the preservation or enjoyment of the wife's separate estate:. Milligan v. Phipps,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PAXSON, C.J., February 20, 1893, 25 Atl.
Rep., i2i; 31 W. N. C., 561; 153 Pa., 208.
PLEDGE OV STOCK nY BROKER.
5. Notice of Ownership-Power of Attorney in Blank-Con-'
version.
The rule that the owner of stock who, by a power of attorney,
signed in blank, has conferred upon another all the indicia of ownership, is estopped to assert his title to it as against a third person who has
in good faith purchased it for value from the apparent owner, does not
obtain where there are circumstances to put such person on inquiry.
Bodmer, a stockbroker in Wilkes-Barre, and defendants, stockbrokers in Philadelphia, were correspondents.
Defendants executed
orders for Bodmer for the purchase and sale of stocks on the Philadelphia and New York Stock Exchanges, dividing the commissions when
the rules did not forbid. There was a private wire between the two
offices, which was used in sending quotations and orders. Plaintiff employed Bodmer to purchase through defendants some stock and bonds,
which were paid for by plaintiff's check to defendants, and the stock and
bonds were sent to Wilkes-Barre. Subsequently plaintiff gave a similar
order to Bodmer for other securities, who transmitted it to defendants,
sending also the first securities, to which were attached blank transfers
signed by plaintiff. These securities were to be held by defendants to
secure part of the purchase money on the new order. Defendants credited them in a general accoiint with Bodmer. Before the purchase money
had been fully paid defendants failed, and the securities were subsequently sold by them or their receiver. Held, in an action for a wrongful conversion of the securities, that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury to determine whether defendants had sufficient notice of
the real ownership of the securities. The facts that Bodmer was a broker
dealing with the defendants for various principals, and that the first
securities purchased had been transferred to plaintiff, were sufficient to
submit to the jury upon the'question of such notice to defendants of title
in plailtiff, as would prevent their relying upon the powers of attorney
attached to the securities: Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa., 379, considered and
distinguished: Ryman v. Gerlach & Harijes, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, DEAN, J. (WILLIAMS and MITCHE.LT, JJ., dissenting), February
6, 1893, 25 Atl. Rep., io3i; 31 W. N. C., 494; 153 Pa., 197.
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TELOGRAPH COMPANIES.
6. Delay in Delivering Mfessage-Mf~ental Ayuish.
In an action against a telegraph company for delay in delivering a
message to a mother to come to her sick son, by reason of which she did
not'reach him until after his death, it is not improper to allege that the
sonfrequently called for her, and asked that she be brought to him, since
her mental anguish might be increased by the knowledge that he wished
to see her, and could not: W. U. Tel. Co. v. Evans, Texas Civil Court
of Appeals, HEAD, J., November I, 1892, 21 S. W. Rep., 226. But se e
Tel. Co. v. Cornwell, 31 Pac. Rep., 393,32 Am. Law Reg. and Rev.,
(January, x893), go, and note.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by WILLIAM STRUTHERS E1LLIS.
,PLASSLEGISLATION.

i.

Regulationof Attorney's Fee in Suits Against Railroadsfor
Killing Live Stock.

A State dtatute which allows a recovery of. an attorney's fee not exceeding ten dollars in actions against railroads for live siock killed on
the track where plaintiff is successful and his demand does not exceed
fifty. dollars, is not unconstitutional as class legislation. It does not discriminate unjustly'against railroad companies, as it operates equally on
all companies within the State, and no other occupation is similarly
situated. The legislature has the right to classify the 'citizens of the
State according to their occupation.
Neither is the Act unconstitutional as a discrimination among liti, gants, since the legislature has the-power to impose fines and forfeitures
as a police regulation when it include all persons within.a 61ass upon
whom the statute can operate: Gulf, C. & S. F. Rwy. Co. v. Ellis, Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas, COLLARD, 3., March 8, 1893, 2r S.-W. Rep.,
933Dun PRocaSS OF LAw.
S 2.- Exclusion of Chinese.
The Chinese Exclusion Act of May 5, 1892, which provides for summary proceedings before a commissioner for the deportation of unauthorized persons, is ilot, by reason of its failure to allow a juiry trial, open to
the objection' that it operates as a denial of due process of law; and such
proceedings do constitute due process of law, inasmuch as they are those
customarily employed in cases of similar character. "If the process is
customary it is that'which is due :" In re Sing Lee, In re Ching Jo, District Court, W. D. Michigan, SEvERE S, D. J., February 28, 1893, 54 Fed.
Rep., 334.

EMINENT DOMAIN.
3. Comensation-Franchises.
The only power which the United States has to condemn a lock and
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dam belonging to a corporation chartered by a State, is derived from the
power to regulate commerce between the several States and with foreign
nations, and such power must always be subject, to the obligation imposed by the Fifth Amendment, to make "just compensation" for private
property taken for public use.
A franchise granted by a State to a corporation for collecting tolls on
a waterway, -which it has improved ander the powers of its charter, is a
vested right, and if Congress thereafter, by condemnation, takes such
improvements, it is bound to make just compensation for the value
of the franchise as well aq for the physical property taken. The fact that
Congress possesses supreme power (as it does in such cases) does not
leave a grant of such a franchise by the State to be a mere license which
is revoked or annulled when Congress, in the subsequent exercise of its
power, takes possession of the improvement: Bridge Co. v. U. S., xo5
U. S., 470 distinguished: Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
Supreme Court of United States, BREWER, J., March 27, 1893, 13 Sup.

Ct. Rep.,
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INTERSTATn COMMERCE.
4. Taxation of Telegraph Companies.
An ordinance compelling a telegraph company to pay five dollars per'
annum for every pole within the city "for the privilege df using the
streets, alleys and public places," is a charge in the nature of a rental,
and is not a privilege or license tax, which would be invalid as applied to
a corporation doing interstate business: 39 Fed. Rep., 59, reversed.
The franchise granted by Act of Congress of July 24, 1866, to any
telegraph company, organized under State laws, enabling it to construct,
maintain and operate lines of telegraph along any military or post roads
of the United States then or thereafter declared such by Act of Congress,
gives no unrestricted right to appropriate public property of a State or
municipality, but, like any other franchise, it is to be exercised in subordination to public and private rights, and, therefore, is no ground of
objection to the imposition by a municipal corporation of a reasonable
charge for the use of its streets by the erection of telegraph poles. Such
reasonable charge a municipal corporation has the right to impose upon
a telegraph company doing interstate business, as compensation for the
space occupied in its streets by the telegraph poles; but the reasonableness of any charge thus fixed is a matter for judicial investigation: City
of St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., Supreme Court of United
States, BREwER, J. (BRow.N, J., dissenting), March 6, 1893, 13 Sup., Ct.
Rep, 485.
PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL COURTS.
5. Following State Decisions-Running of Statute of Limilations.
The settled construction by the highest court of a State. of the
State Statute of Limitations, will be recognized as a rule of decision by
the United States Supreme Court, and the duty of the Court to follow
such construction is not affected by the adoption of a different construction of atsimilar statute in another State: Bauserman v. Blunt, Supreme
Court of United States, GRAY, J., March 6, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 466.

CORPORATIONS.
6. State Statutes as Rules of Decision-Assignmentfor Benefit
of Creditors.
A decision of the highest Court of *aState as to the construction and
effect of a statute of the State regulating assignments for the benefit of
"creditors, is of controlling authority in the Courts of the United States;
it is immaterial that a similar statute is construed differently in another

State: May v. Tenney, Supreme Court of United States, BREWR, J.,
March 6, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 491.
7. State Statietes as Rules of Decision-Enforcement of Bail
Bonds.in FederalCourts.
Although under Rev. St., 1014, all proceedings for holding accused
persons to bail to answer before a Federal Court are assimilated to the
prO6eedings in vogue for similar purposes in the State where the proceedings take place, yet in enforcing a forfeited bond taken in a criminal
case the United States is'not restricted to the remedies provided by the
laws of the State, but. may proceed according to the Common Law,
under which, as modified by Acts .of Congress, the Federal Courts proceed in the trial and disposition of criminal cases. Hence a forfeited
bond may be proceeded on by a scirefaiiasin a pariicular State, though
by the law .of that State an independent action is necessary: United
States v. Insley, Circuit .Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, THAYER,
D. J., February 6, 1893, 54 Fed. Rep., 221.
PUBLIC ScHoOrs.

8.

Taxation-Race-Discrimination.

The establishment by the legislature of a school exclusively for
whites, and the issue of bonds by the town in which said school is
"" located to pay therefor, is not forbidden by a provision in the State Constitution requiring the legislature to maintain a uniform system of free
public schools, nor -is it in conflict with the provision for equal and
uniform taxation, as the local taxation in this case is for local purposes
and benefits.
The proviso in the State Constitution inhibiting any distinction
-among.citizens does not prevent legislation making separate provision
for the different races in the matter of schools. Such a proviso should
not be taken literally. "It is probable that' it was a mere platitude,
intended to announce the general proposition for legislative observance,
that equality and fairness niay govern appropriation of public money for
public institutions :" Chrisman v. Mayor of Brookhaven, Supreme Court
of Mississippi, CAmPBEILL, C. J., January 30, 1893, 12 So. Rep., 458.

CORPORATIONS.
Cases selected by LEwis LAWRENCE SMITH.
BENEFICIAL AssocIATIoNs.

x. When Not Insurance Compfanies.
An association organized not to do business for profit or gain, but to
pecuniarily aid the widows, orphans, heirs and devisees of its members,
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is not an insurance company and the contracts it issues contracts of
insurance, but it is rather of a beneficial or philanthropic character:
Northwestern Masonic Aid Association v. Jones, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, THO.PSON, J., April 3, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 253; 32 W. N. C.,

169; 154 Pa., 99CONSOLIDATION.
2. Liabilityfor Tort of OriginalCompfany.
A corporation into which several railroad companies become merged
by consolidation assumes, by implication, all the debts and liabilities of
the several companies, and in an action against the consolidated company for personal injuries resulting from the negligence of one of the
original companies, plaintiff need not allege nor prove an express
assumption of such liability by defendant in the articles of consolidation:
Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Prewitt, Supreme Court of Indiana,
HOWARD, J., February i5, 1893, 33 N. E. Rep., 367.
'DISSOLUTION.
3. Rights of Creditors.
Where the charter of a corporation provides that notice of a meeting to alter or amend the charter shall be advertised for a stated time,
the dissolution of such corporation by its stockholders before the expiration of its charter period is as to existing creditors an alteration of an
important character,-which cannot be effected at a meeting held without
such notice, so as tQ prevent them from levying an attachment. But
neither general creditors, nor creditors with attachments against a corporation, can enjoin the stockholders thereof from dissolvingthe corporation in the absence of fraud or of damage other than that caused by previous gross mismanagement, and that which will result from the dissolution; Fisk v. Railroad Co., io Blatchf., S18, distinguished: Cleveland
City Forge Iron Co. v. Taylor Bros. Iron Works, et al., Circuit Court,
Eastern District of Louisiana, BILLINGS, D. J., February 22, 1893, 54
Fed. Rep., 85.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

4. Domicile.
A. statute of Massachusetts provides that " all personal property
within or without the Commonwealth shall be assessed to the owner in
the city or town where he is an inhabitant on the first day of May."
This does not apply to foreign corporations, as the word "inhabitant"
means one whose domicile is in the place referred to, and the domicile
of a corporation is in the State of its origin, and it retains that domicile
irrespective of the residence of its officers or the place where its business
is transacted: Boston Investment Company v. City of Boston, Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, XxowLToN, J., March 7, 1893, 33 N. E.
Rep., 58o.
INSOLVENcY.
5. Assets a Trust Fnd.
The Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. organized various corporations to
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operate a telegraph system, and furnished their entire capital stock.
Judgment was obtained against one of these subordinate corporations for
breach of contract. The railroad company-sold the subordinate company and received all the consideration, and left it insolvent and without
assets of any kind. Held, that the money realized by the railroad company was impressed with a trust in favor of the judgment creditor of the
subordinate corporation, and the company was liable foe the claim:
Balto. & 0. Tel. Co. v. Interstate Tel. Co.j Circuit Court of Appeals,
'Fourth Circuit, SIMONTON, J., February 7, 1893, 54 Fed. Rep., 5o.
RAILROAD MORTGAGES.
6.. PriorUnsecuredLiens.
While it is true that "if current earnings are used for the benefit of
mortgage creditors before current, expenses are paid, the mortgage
security is chargeable in equity with the restoration of the fund which
has been thus improperly applied to their use" (Burnham v. Bowen, III
U. S., 776), yet a claim for cutting down and clearing away timber from
the road for its original'construction, cannot be given preference on foreclosure of a prior moitgage on the road. Such debts are supposed to be
paid out of the fund arising from the original sale df stock and bonds:
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pine Bluff M. &N. 0. Ry. Co., Supreme
Court ot Arkansas, MARTIN, Special Judge, February I8, 1893, 21 S. W.
Rep.,'652.
SVmscRITIONS TO STOCM.
7. Conditions Precedent.
A prospectus of an opera house company stated that its building was
"to be built by a corporation with a capital stock of $2oooo, cdnsisting
of roob shares at $20 per share." The company issued a call on defendant
for his subscription to this prospectus, which he failed to pay. It was
held that it was not a condition precedent to defendant's liability that
$2o,ooo of plaintiff's stock should be first subscribed for: 4iibun Opera
House, etc., Co. v. Hil, Supreme Court of Lalifornia, PER CUnws,
March 9, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., 587.
8. 'Originaland New Sock.
M. was the owner of eighty-five shares of stock of the Balto. City
Pass. Ry. 'Co., and subscribed to eighty-five shares of ne'w stock that the
company was authorized to issue. Before the new stock was paid for, M.
died, and her executor sold the original stock to H. This sale carried
the right to subsciibe to the new stock. H. filed a bill against the company praying that it be required to transfer the new stock. and issue' a
certificate therefor to him, subject to the right of the company to exact
payment for the stock. The Court dismissed the bill, holding that an
original subscription to stock, before the incorporation of the company,
gave the subscriber the rights incident to the holding of stock; but that
a subscription to a new issue was a mere contract of the company to
enter' his name on the stock book, on the one hand, and of the subscriber to pay for the stock on the other, and gave no such rights: Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Hambleton, Court of Appeals of Maryland,
McSHERRY, J., March 16, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 279.

EQUITY.

EQUITy.
Cases selected.by ROBERT P. BRADFORD.
CREDITORS' BILLS.
and FederalPractice.
i. When MJainainable-Priorities-State
A creditors' bill to set aside an assignment of all the, debtor's property for the benefit of creditors, may be maintained, though plaintiff's
claim has not been reduced to judgment, when such claim is recognized
and provided for in the deed of assignment, and is not disputed by the
pleadings, since it is obvious that a judgment and execution would
afford no remedy at all, and that there is no remedy at law: 46 Fed.
Rep., S8o, affirmed.
The fact that by statute in Virginia a complainant in a creditors' bill
obtains priority of payment, does not give him such priority when the
suit is brought in the United States Circuit Court within such State:
Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S., Io6, followed: Talby v. Curtain, Circuit'Court
of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, SIMONTON, D. J., February 7, 1893, 54 Fed.
Rep., 43.
FRAUD.
Delay.
2. Rescission,of Contract-Unreasonable
Where a party is entitled to rescind a contract on the ground df
fraud, he must act promptly, with no vacillation, no unreasonable delay,
no attempt to speculate upon his option. He must elect to rescind, and
proceed as far as lies in his power to place himself andpurchaser in statu
quo. This is especially true as applied to speculative property which is
liable to great fluctuation in value: 49 Fed. Rep., 512, affirmed. Therefore, where the owner of mining property, thinking the same has become
exhausted, sells it to one who practises no fraud to obtain it, he cannot
maintain a bill to rescind the sale after the lapse pf seven years, and after,
the discovery of additional ores, which enhance the value of the land
many fold: Kinne v. Webb, Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
SANBORN, Cir. J., February 6, 1893, 54 Fed. Rep., 34.
INJUNCTION.
3.

Dissotulion.

A dissolution, like the granting of injunction, is largely a matter of
judicial discretion, which must be determined by the nature of the particular cause under consideration; and while it is a well-settled rule that
when the sworn answer fully and unequivocally denies all the material
allegations of the complaint upon which the complainant's equities rest,
the injunction will be dissolved, yet such rule is not without exception,
and a court may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, refuse a dissolution when there is ground for apprehending some irreparable injury or
great hardship, if the injunction is dissolved before the hearing of the
case upon the merits: Huron Waterworks Co. v. Huron, Supreme Court
of South Dakota, BENNETT, P. J., March 15, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., 652.
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INSURANCE.

NUIsANc.

4. InjunCtion-Polluionof Stream-Adequate Remedy at Law.
The discharge of refuse matter from a strawboard factory into a nonnavigable river, used by a water company owning land fronting on and
extending along said river, as a source of supply for furnishing a city,
its inhabitants, and others with water for domestic, manufacturing and
other purposes requiring purity of the supply, thereby fouling and polluting such stream, is necessarily a continuing nuisance, for which no
plain, adequate, and completeremedy exists at law, and injunction will
lie-to restrain such discharge.
In such a case plaintiff has not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, so as to oust the circuit court of jurisdiction, by reason of
Rev. St., 723, providing that suits in equity shall not be sustained in
the United States courts in cases where such a remedy may be had at
law.
The federal courts will enforce, either at law or in equity, according
to their nature, any new rights created by State statutes, but their equitable jurisdiction of equitable rights cannot be affected by State statutes
making such rights enforceable at law: Indianapolis Water Co. vz. American Strawboard Co., Circuit Court, District of Indiana, BAKER, D. J.,
February 6, 1893, 53 Fed. Rep., 970.
!PlEADINc.

5.

Multifariousness-Demurrer.

A bill to foreclose four distinct mortgages of different dates, all of
which werq given by the same person, and are owned by complainant,
though they contain different exceptions in favor of a number of different persons, lessees and grantees, all of whom are made defendants,.
together with others claiming interests in the land, personal judgment
being asked only against the nortgagor, is not multifarious. Even if such
a bill is multifarious, the mortgagor cannot demur on that ground, since
there is no misjoinder df claims as'against him, and the rule that, for a
misjoinder of defendants, those only can demur who are improperly
joined, applies with equal force to a misjoinder of matters: Torrent v.
Hamilton, Supreme Court of Michigan, MCGRATH, C. J., March io, 1893,
54 N. W. Rep., 634.

INSURANCRh
Cases selected by HoR-Aca L. CHEYiNY.

F= INSURANCE.
i.

Exfplosion-Liability.

Where an insurance policy provides that the insurer shall not be
liable for loss caused by" explosion of any kind, unless fire ensues, and
then for the loss or damage by fire only," no liability exists for damage
done by an explosion produced by the ignition of a match in a room filled
with illuminating gas, since the explosion of the gas, and not the light-
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ing of the match, is the proximate cause of the loss: Heuer v. Northwestern Ins. Co., Supreme Court of Illinois, MAGRUDER, J., January 10,
1893, 33 N. R. Rep., 4XI.
MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE.
2. Assignment of Certificate-Beneficiaries.
The Public Statutes of Massachusetts, c. 119, 167, providing that
when a policy of insurance is effected by any person on his own life, for
-the benefit of his representatives, or a third person, the person for whose
benefit it was made shall be entitled thereto against the creditors and
representatives of the perspn effecting the same, does not apply to a certificate issued by a benefit association so as to defeat an assignment of
such certificate: Anthony v. Massachusetts Ben. Ass'n., Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, LATEROP, j., March 3, 1893,33 N. B. Rep., 557.
3.

Beneficial Associations, When Not Insurance Companies.
- See CORPORATIONS, I.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
Casesselected by ]qAYvNF R. LONGSTRETH.
•CUSToMS DUTIES.
i. Breakage on Voyage.
Window glass, which was in a sound condition when it was shipped,
'but has been broken on the voyage, so as to be useless, except for
re-manufacture, is entitled to free entryunder paragraph 500 of the Tariff
.Act of October I, i89o, for it is, for tariff purposes, different merchandise
from that which was shipped, and not merely damaged merchandise of
:the same kind: In re Bache, Circuit Court, Southern District of New
York, CoxE, D. J., February io, 1893, 54 Fed. Rep., 371.
.HIGHWAYS.

2. Adverse Possession-Sbstitution.
While the public cannot be ousted by adverse possession of its rights
-to a highway once dedicated, although obstructed for over one hundred
years, yet there may grow up, in consequence, private rights of more
.persuasive force in the particular case than those of the public; and
where a highway has been obstructed, and another way equally convenient has been in use by general and long-continued acquiescence, the
latter will be considered as substituted for the original way, which cannot then be re-opened to the injury of the land owner: Almy v. Church,
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, STINsSS, J., February 4, 1893, 26 Atl.
Rep., 58.

PLLADING AND PRACTICE.
3. Railways in .Strecl-Rightsof Abutting Owners.
Where the abutting owners do not own to the middle of the street,
the occupation of the street by a railway structure does not result in
damage to their property peculiar and different in kind from that suffered
by the community in general ; for injuries resulting from the careful construction and operation of a railroad on the land of another, are common
to all those whose lands are ii close proximity to such road, and for such
injuries there can be no recovery: Decker v. Evansville Suburban Railway Co., Supreme Court of Indiana, CoprEv, C. J., February I, 1893, 33,
N. E. Rep., 349.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

4. Social Clubs-Sales to Personsnot Members.
Upon the indictment of a member of an incorporated society for
selling liquor without a license at the annual picnic of the society, it was
held,without deciding the question of the right of a society to sell liquors
without a. license to its members at a profit (as affirmed by the lower
court), that if the defendant sold tickets with which liquors could be
obtained to persons not members of the society, he was liable: Commonwealth 'v. -Loesch, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WILLIAMS, J., March
20,1893; 26 Atl. Rep., 208; 32 W. N. C., 97; 153 Pa., 502. See 31 Am. LwRiG. AND Rzv., 862, 892.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
Cases selected by ARDEMUS STwART.
PLEADING.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

i. Selting Aside Award on Gtound of Fraud.
Where it is sought to set aside an award of .rbitration on the ground
of fraud, partiality, and mistake, the facts constituting the objection
must be specifically averred-general allegations are not sufficient: Bow-.
den v. Crow, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, HEAD, J., March 2, 1893,
21 S. W. Rep., 612.
DEmURRER.

2. Suflciency of.
A demurrer to an answer containing several paragraphs, setting forth
that plaintiff demurs severally to the second, third, and fourth paragraphs
thereof for the reason that neither of said paragraphs contains sufficient
facts, in law, to constitute a defence to the complaint, is unobjectionable
in form, and challenges the sufficiency of each paragraph: Funk v.
Rentchler, Supreme Court of Indiana, HACKNEY, J., February 18, 1893,
33 N. E. Rep., 364.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

PRACTICE.
FEDERAL COURTS.

3. Costs- Taxation-[[itness Fees.
A party in a federal court can only recover as costs the actual amount
of fees paid each witness, and only to the extent of the amount legally
due such witness; and where he has paid some witnesses more and some
less than their legal fees, the legal fees of all cannot be grouped together
o make the sum equal the amount paid to all: Burrow v. Kansas City,
Ft. S. & M. R. Co., Circuit Court of the Western Distrid of Tennessee,
HAMMOND, J., February 27, 1893, 54 Fed. Rep., 278.
4. Judgment-ResJudicata.
Where, in a suit in a federal court against a trustee for a discovery
.and accounting, it appears that the precise questions were presented and
.adjudicated in prior litigation in the State courts, between the same parties, as to the same subject-matter, and there is no evidence of fraud in
procuring the adjudication, the doctrine of res judicataapplies, and com-plainant will be denied relief: De Chambrun v. Campbell, Circuit Court,
Northern District of New York, CORER, Dist. J., February i6, 1893, 54
Fed. Rep., 231.
5. Removal of Causes-DiverseCilizenship-Procedure-Affpeal.
Under the removal acts, an allegation showing diverse "residence"
-is not equivalentto an allegation of diverse "citizenship," and is insufficient to-show federal jurisdiction: Pennsylvania Co. v. Bender, Supreme
-Court of the United States, BREwER, J., Mfarch 20, 1893, 13 'Sup. Ct. Rep.,
591; S. P., Wolfe v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 13 Sup. CL Rep.,
.602.

Issus DZVISAVIT VUL ION.
6. PreliminaryIssue to DetermineRelationship of Contestan.
When the petition for an issue devisavit vel non alleges that peti"-tioner is son and heir at law of testator, and the answer thereto denies
the relationship, or any interest therein of. petitioner, and asks an issue
in the first instance to determine the petitioner's interest, it is error to
-deny the latter issue and to grant the former, for, if petitioner fails to
-maintain his alleged interest, he is not entitled to maintain his petition:
-Rogers' Estate, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WILLIAMS;J., April 3,
1893, 26 At. Rep., 225; 32 W. N. C., 176; 154 Pa., 217.
:REPLEWIN. 7. Goods FraudulentlyPurchased-Returnof Price Paid.
Replevin may be maintained for the recovery of goods alleged to
'have been fraudulently obtained under the guise of a contract of sale,
,without the return, before suit, of money.paid as a part of the consideration for the goods: Sisson v. Hill, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, MAT"TFsoN, C.J., February 25,

1893,

26 Aft. Rep., 196.

.. ES JUDICATA.
8. Judgment-Conclsiveness.
A judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, affirmed by the Supreme
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'PROPERTY.

Court on appeal, is conclusive, not only of the matters considered, butthose which might have been considered by the exercise of due diligefice
by the parties in the preparation and trial of the case: Pennock v. Kennedy, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WILLIAMS, J., March 20, 1893, 26
Atl. Rep., 217; 32 W. N. C., 99; 153 Pa., 579.
SURVICB O- WRIT.
9. Corporhtion Officials.
Where summons is served on a member of a corporation as its president, and he tells the officer that another person is president, as does also
the treasurer of the corporation, and service is made on him, the corporation cannot, for the purpose of showing that it was not properly summoned, prove that such person was not its president: Wilson v. California
Wine Co., Suprenme Court of Michigan, LONG, J., March 10, 1893, 52 -N.

W. Rep., 643.
WRIT OF PROHIBITION.
io. Levy of Taxes.
A nrit of prohibition will not lie, on the petition of one city, torestrain tile levy of taxes for the municipal purposes of another city, from
which the former has been severed, since the levy of a tax is not a judicial act: City of Coronado et al. v. City of San Diego, Supreme Court of
California, GAROU=TT, J., March 2, 1893, 32 Pac..Rep., 518.

PROPERTY.
Cases select d by WILLIAM A. DAvIs.
DBED.
i.

Constructionof-Fee Simple.

A grant to a certain person and his heirs and assigns of the right to
build and use a dock on certain land within certain lines, "the above
right to include all the rights" of the grantor within those lines, togetherwith all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto
belonging, etc., does not convey a fee in the land, but only an easement
to build and use the dock: Munro v. Meesh, Sfipreme Court of Michigan,
GRANT, J., February 1O, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., 290.
2.

Reservation-Railroad.

A deed of railroad land "reserving and excepting" so many feet
wide to be used for a right of Way and other railroad'purposes, in case
the line of said road shall be located on or over the same, does not
operate as an exception of the strip from the grant, but merely as a
reservation of a right of way or easement in the land, and the title to the
whole tract vests in the grantee by virtue of the deed: Biles v. Tacoma
0. & G. H. R. Co., Supreme Court of Washington, ANDERS, J., lanuary13, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., 211.

TORTS.

TORTS.
Cases selected by ALEXANDER

DURBIN LAUER.

DEVAMATION.

I.

Libel-What Constitutes- Words Tending to InjureBusiness.

A circular letter of and concerning an agent and broker for government supply contractors, composed, published and sent by the secretary
of the interior to intending bidders for such supply contracts, and stating
that "any interference on the part of W. R. L. [plaintiff], a former chief
of the stationery and printing division, with the business in any way,
will not be to the interest of any person or firm represented," is capable
of a libelous interpretation, and a complaint which properly pleads the
same is good as against a demurrer. The question whether the words.
are defamatory in the sense used is for the jury: Lapham v. Noble,
United States Circuit Court, S. D. New York, WALLACE, C. J., February
6, 1893, 54 Fed. Rep., io8.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
2.

Liability of Master for Torts of Servant-Excessive Dam ages.

It is within the scope of the employment of a salesman left in charge
of his employer's store to cause the arrest of a person stealing therefrom,
and the employer will be liable for his act in causing the arrest of a customer whom he erroneously suspected of theft. But verdict awardingplaintiff $750 against the employer was held grossly excessive, as there
was no-evidence to show that he participated in or'approred of the
wrongful act of his servant:'Staples v. Schmid, Supreme Court of Rhode
Island, DOUGAS, J., February 25, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., 193.
NEGLIGENCE.

3.

Contributory Negligence-Surveyor's Instrument Left
Highway.

in"

The plaintiffs set up a surveyer's instrument in. the roadway of a
public street, and left it without any one to look after its safety or towarn persons of its presence. The defendant was driving slowly along
the street, looking at some houses on the side of the street, for the roofing of which he had contracted, to see whether the slaters were getting
them finished. The street was unobstructed except by the plaintiffs'
instrument. The defendant did not see the instrument, and had no
reason to expect to encounter an instrument of that or any other character. Held, That the plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence,
and that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant to go to the jury: Stat v. Lauer, Supreme Court of New Jersey,
DEPUE, J., March 20, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep., i8o.

WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
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TORT-F1ASORS.
4. Contribution Between.
Where two creditors, acting together, attach and sell goods sold by
their debtor to a third person, under an honest belief that such latter
sale is fraudulent and void, one of them, after paying a judgment
recovered against him .by the debtor's vendee for wrongful seizure and
sale of the goods, may enforce contribution from the other: Vandiver v.
Pollak, Supreme Court of Alabama, HsAn, J., January 26, 1893, 12 So.
Rep., 473-

WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Cases selected by MAURICE CG.BLKN'AP.
D-SCXNT OV lkBALTY.
i.

Death DuringForeclosureof Mortgage-Conversion.

Where a mortgagor dies after the entry of a decree in foreclosure,
but before sale, his interest in land descends as real estate to his widow
and heirs; since payment of the amount due on the mortgage and costs
at any time before sale was'completed would extinguish the power of
sale, and thus prevent a conversion - Holden v. Dunn, Supreme Court of
Illinois, ScHormILnD, J., January 19, 1893, 33 N. R. Rep., 413.
DOWMR.
2.

Abolition by Statue-Effet dis t&Existing Marriage.

Dower right during the life of the husband is in no sense an interest
in real estate or property of which value can be predicated, and, therefore, when a husband conveyed land without loining hiis wife in the deed,
at a time when a dower right existed, but at the time of his death statute
had abolished the right of dower, the widow was held to have no dower
in the land conveyed: Richards v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., Circuit
Court of Appeals, Northern Division of Washington, KNoWLzS, J.,
January 16, 1893, 54 Fed. Rep., 200.
EQUITABIM EXLCTION.
3. One Taking Benefit under a Will Estoppedfrom Asserting
Adverse Right.
An heir or representative, upon whom a benefit is conferred by a
will, is put to an equitable election, and must take either under or
against the will. If he accept the benefit, he will be required to carry
out the provisions of the will. Where, therefore, a devisee claims under
a will valid by the laws of Pennsylvania, he cannot deny its operation
upon property without the State given to another because the laws
operative there require more witnesses than are necessary by the laws of
Pennsylvania, without compensating such disappointed devisee: Cuni, J., February
mings' Estate, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WIuiS,
2o, 1893, 25 AUt. Rep., 1125; 32 W. N. C., 173; 153 Pa., 397.

